Bitcoin can only ensure the security of payments when a payment verification time
of few tens of minutes can be tolerated. Moreover,
our results show that the verification time of payments exhibits a large variance as it depends on
the confirmation of transactions in blocks—which
follows a shifted geometric distribution. This slow
payment verification is clearly inappropriate for fast
payments; it is, however, essential for the detection
of double-spending attacks.
The double-spending resilience of Bitcoin in fast payments, in which the time to acquire a service is in the order of few seconds. More specifically, we showed that not only these attacks succeed with overwhelming probability, but also that, contrary to common beliefs, they do not incur any significant overhead on the at- tacker. For that purpose, we analyzed the conditions for performing successful double-spending at- tacks against fast payments in Bitcoin and we experimentally confirmed our analysis. As far as we are aware, our experiments constitute the first comprehensive double-spending measurements in Bitcoin. It is noteworthy that we have performed thousands of double-spending attempts using fixed Bitcoin ad- dresses without having to bear any type of penalty.
Finally, we explored the solution space for securing Bitcoin against double-spending attacks. Our findings show that the measures recommended by Bitcoin developers for fast transactions are not al- ways effective in resisting double-spending. By lever- aging on our results, we propose a lightweight mea- sure that would enable the secure and albeit verification of Bitcoin transactions.
Given that the vulnerability of existing clients to double-spending might severely harm the growth of Bitcoin, and impact its financial and economic standing, we argue that the integration of double- spending countermeasures in the current implementation of Bitcoin emerges as a necessity. As we show in this work, the propagation of double-spending alerts in the network would constitute a first important step towards efficiently detecting double- spending.
The double-spending resilience of Bitcoin in fast payments, in which the time to acquire a service is in the order of few seconds. More specifically, we showed that not only these attacks succeed with overwhelming probability, but also that, contrary to common beliefs, they do not incur any significant overhead on the at- tacker. For that purpose, we analyzed the conditions for performing successful double-spending at- tacks against fast payments in Bitcoin and we experimentally confirmed our analysis. As far as we are aware, our experiments constitute the first comprehensive double-spending measurements in Bitcoin. It is noteworthy that we have performed thousands of double-spending attempts using fixed Bitcoin ad- dresses without having to bear any type of penalty.
Finally, we explored the solution space for securing Bitcoin against double-spending attacks. Our findings show that the measures recommended by Bitcoin developers for fast transactions are not al- ways effective in resisting double-spending. By lever- aging on our results, we propose a lightweight mea- sure that would enable the secure and albeit verification of Bitcoin transactions.
Given that the vulnerability of existing clients to double-spending might severely harm the growth of Bitcoin, and impact its financial and economic standing, we argue that the integration of double- spending countermeasures in the current implementation of Bitcoin emerges as a necessity. As we show in this work, the propagation of double-spending alerts in the network would constitute a first important step towards efficiently detecting double- spending.
Blockchain Help provides proper security analysis and also helps in development of secure exchanges.
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